Nuclear Deterrence vs Nuclear Disarmament: A Comparative Analysis

Nuclear weapons have been a source of international tension and debate since their development in the 1940s. Two competing approaches have emerged in international relations and law regarding how to address the existential threat posed by nuclear arms: nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament. This essay will compare and contrast these two approaches, examining their underlying principles, legal frameworks, and effectiveness from an international law perspective.

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Nuclear deterrence refers to the strategic doctrine that the threat of nuclear retaliation prevents adversaries from using nuclear weapons or engaging in large-scale conventional warfare (Freedman, 2004). The core logic is that the devastating consequences of nuclear war make it an irrational choice, so states are deterred from aggression by the prospect of mutually assured destruction. In contrast, nuclear disarmament advocates for the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons globally through legally binding agreements and verification mechanisms (Perkovich and Acton, 2008).

From a legal standpoint, nuclear deterrence policies rely primarily on the inherent right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945). Nuclear weapons states argue that maintaining a nuclear arsenal is a legitimate means of deterring armed attacks and preserving national security. The 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons did not definitively rule out the legality of nuclear deterrence, stating that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would "generally be contrary to international law", but that the Court could not "conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence" (ICJ, 1996).

Nuclear disarmament efforts, on the other hand, are grounded in a range of international legal instruments. The cornerstone is the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which obligates nuclear weapons states to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament (United Nations, 1968). This commitment was reaffirmed and strengthened in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (United Nations, 1995). Other key legal frameworks supporting disarmament include the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 and various nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties (United Nations, 1996).

A significant development in disarmament law came with the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017, which comprehensively bans nuclear weapons and related activities for its parties (United Nations, 2017). While none of the nuclear weapons states have joined the TPNW, its proponents argue that it strengthens the legal norm against nuclear weapons and puts pressure on nuclear states to make progress on disarmament (Ritchie, 2019).

Comparing the two approaches, nuclear deterrence has been credited by its advocates with preventing large-scale conflicts between nuclear powers since World War II (Waltz, 1981). Proponents argue that it has provided strategic stability and reduced the likelihood of conventional wars escalating to nuclear exchanges. From this perspective, nuclear weapons serve as the ultimate guarantor of national security in an anarchic international system.

However, critics of deterrence theory point out several flaws and risks. There is an inherent contradiction in threatening to use weapons that would cause catastrophic humanitarian consequences in order to prevent their use (Wilson, 2008). Deterrence also relies on rational decision-making by all actors, which may not hold true in crisis situations or with non-state actors. Furthermore, the continued existence of nuclear arsenals poses risks of accidental detonation, miscalculation, or theft by terrorist groups (Lewis et al., 2014).

From an international law standpoint, nuclear deterrence policies exist in an ambiguous legal space. While not explicitly prohibited, the threat or use of nuclear weapons likely violates core principles of international humanitarian law, including the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks and the principle of proportionality (Joyner, 2009). The incompatibility between deterrence and humanitarian law was highlighted in the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion, which stated that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law" (ICJ, 1996).

Nuclear disarmament, in contrast, aligns more closely with established principles of international law. The NPT creates a legal obligation for nuclear weapons states to pursue disarmament negotiations in good faith. This was reinforced by the ICJ, which unanimously held that "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control" (ICJ, 1996). The TPNW further strengthens the legal framework for disarmament by establishing a comprehensive prohibition regime.

Proponents of disarmament argue that it is the only way to permanently eliminate the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons (Perkovich and Acton, 2008). They contend that deterrence is inherently unstable in the long term and that the risks of nuclear use - whether intentional or accidental - outweigh any perceived security benefits. From this perspective, progress on disarmament is essential for upholding the NPT regime and preventing further proliferation.

However, disarmament faces significant practical and political challenges. Nuclear weapons states have been reluctant to make substantial progress on disarmament, citing strategic stability concerns and the need to maintain deterrence against potential adversaries (Kristensen and Korda, 2019). Verification of disarmament also poses technical challenges, particularly around confirming the dismantlement of warheads. Critics argue that in the absence of major changes to the international security environment, nuclear disarmament remains unrealistic (Tertrais, 2010).

In assessing the effectiveness of the two approaches, nuclear deterrence has arguably been successful in preventing direct military confrontation between nuclear powers. However, it has not prevented all conflicts or crises between nuclear-armed states, as evidenced by the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan (Ganguly and Hagerty, 2005). The logic of deterrence has also not halted nuclear proliferation, with several states acquiring nuclear weapons since the NPT entered into force.

Disarmament efforts have achieved some notable successes, including significant reductions in the global nuclear stockpile from its Cold War peak. The NPT has been largely effective in limiting horizontal proliferation, with only four states acquiring nuclear weapons outside the treaty framework (Mukhatzhanova, 2014). Nuclear-weapon-free zones now cover most of the Southern Hemisphere. However, progress on disarmament by nuclear weapons states has stalled in recent years, with all nuclear-armed states engaged in modernizing their arsenals (Kristensen and Korda, 2019).

From an international law perspective, the trend appears to be moving gradually away from acceptance of nuclear deterrence and towards strengthening the legal framework for disarmament. The adoption of the TPNW, despite the non-participation of nuclear weapons states, represents a significant shift in the legal landscape. It reinforces the delegitimization of nuclear weapons and creates new legal obligations for its parties (Ritchie, 2019). The treaty's proponents argue that it will create pressure for nuclear weapons states to take disarmament more seriously, similar to how previous prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons spurred disarmament in those areas.

However, the effectiveness of the TPNW in achieving concrete disarmament progress remains to be seen. Nuclear weapons states have strongly opposed the treaty, arguing that it ignores the realities of the international security environment and could undermine existing non-proliferation and disarmament frameworks like the NPT (Ford, 2018). This highlights the ongoing tension between disarmament aspirations and the perceived security benefits of nuclear deterrence.

In conclusion, nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament represent fundamentally different approaches to addressing the threat posed by nuclear weapons. While deterrence has arguably contributed to strategic stability between nuclear powers, it exists in an ambiguous legal space and carries inherent risks. Disarmament aligns more closely with principles of international law and humanitarian concerns, but faces significant political and practical obstacles to implementation.

From an international law perspective, there is a clear trend towards delegitimizing nuclear weapons and strengthening the legal basis for disarmament. However, reconciling this trend with the national security policies of nuclear-armed states remains a major challenge. Moving forward, bridging the gap between deterrence and disarmament may require new approaches that address both security concerns and humanitarian imperatives. This could involve intermediate steps such as de-alerting nuclear forces, adopting no-first-use policies, and pursuing further arms control measures to reduce nuclear risks while working towards the long-term goal of elimination (Perkovich and Acton, 2008).

Ultimately, resolving the tension between nuclear deterrence and disarmament will require sustained diplomatic efforts, creative legal and technical solutions, and a fundamental re-evaluation of the role of nuclear weapons in national and international security. While the path forward remains uncertain, continued engagement with these issues through international law and institutions is essential for making progress towards a world free from the existential threat of nuclear warfare.

References

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